

OPPOSITION TO SOVIET SCHEMES

tions in Embassy rooms or gardens, but these were never so late, as those of the Soviets.

In 1944 the Iranian Minister of Communications, Hazhir, journeyed to London. This was interpreted by observers as a manifestation of British-Iranian friendship and as an indication of British interest in the railway development of Iran. The British encouraged contacts between the Iranian army and air force and the British military services. Official visits to the fighting fronts and to Great Britain were organized for Iranian generals and younger officers. The British manifested their willingness to help Iran economically in the difficult war period. A special agreement between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian government provided for the payment of a certain minimum of royalties, although the company was not officially obliged to pay the whole sum thereby stipulated because of the curtailment of exports in wartime. The grain supplies to Iran have already been mentioned in connection with Soviet policies. In 1943 the British Embassy presented the Iranian government with a thousand-bed hospital at the outbreak of the epidemic. The Middle East Supply Center, an Anglo-American institution which had its branch office in Teheran, was instrumental in solving basic supply problems of Iran. It was headed in Teheran first by Lt-Colonel Hobson, an Englishman of the A.I.O.C., and later by Colonel Harold Hoskins, an American industrialist. In the eyes of merchants and manufacturers its activity contrasted pleasantly with Soviet obstruction in north-south trade and shipments. A word must also be said of various British

charitable enterprises
such as aid given to victims of the Gorgan
earthquake. Red Cross
activity, and the promotion of health and
welfare among the tribes.
With reference to the latter the activities of
a Miss Palmer-Smith
were notable, although rumor ascribed to
her political and intelli-
gence tasks in addition. The charitable
activities of the British re-
ceived less newspaper publicity than did
those of the Soviet. Yet,
under the specific conditions of wartime
Iranian politics, it was
difficult to determine in each case where
charity ended and propa-
ganda began.

This leads us to the organization of British
propaganda apparatus.